

[Part 2 – Costa Rice AM Bruno Stagno Ugarte]

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Colleagues,

[1. Argumente für Ratifikation]

The Treaty itself sufficiently defines purpose and mandate of this Article XIV Conference: It shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty. At the same time, it intends to enhance the understanding of universal ownership of the CTBT and to stimulate efforts by all members of the Treaty to help create a more favourable climate and more conducive conditions for the early entry into force of the CTBT.

Participants of this Conference might wish to consider and to discuss how others, especially the ten Annex 2 States as the main addressees of our considerations could be supported in their efforts to appreciate the merits of multilateralism in arms control and, specifically, of early entry into force of the CTBT.

We have identified a number of good arguments at our disposal and we would just like to propose a few:

1. As an important non-proliferation instrument the CTBT constrains the development and qualitative improvement of new and more advanced nuclear weapons; it severely constrains the capacity of non nuclear weapons states to develop new nuclear weapons and

- it prevents the proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge that can be used for nuclear weapons.
2. Ratification will strengthen the CTBT regime and tighten the still-open door.
 3. The CTBT not only contributes to international, regional and national peace and security, it also helps prevent further devastation of human health and the global environment.
 4. The comprehensive ban on testing is not discriminatory, it treats all Members equally, and data and other products are provided to all Member States with the same quality and speed.
 5. The CTBT has been fulfilling its core objective and no CTBT ratifying State has enacted a nuclear test explosion (the same applies to the NPT as no NPT Member State has developed military nuclear capacities).
 6. The global CTBT verification regime has proven itself efficient, capable to detect non-compliance with the Treaty and therefore can be regarded as a reliable deterrent.
 7. Data collected by the 321 technical stations of the IMS will offer each Member State full benefits while each Member State will only contribute to the financing of its assessed percentage.
 8. Concrete or possible threats caused by nuclear proliferation can only be resolved in a sustained way by also addressing underlying issues of the multilateral treaty-based security system.
 9. In the possible grey zone which makes it difficult to distinguish with certainty between a peaceful nuclear program and a military program the CTBT provides a firm barrier between these two. Concretely, this would imply that for any CTBT Member it would be next to impossible to turn a peaceful nuclear program into

effective nuclear weapons since the CTBT would rule out testing of those nuclear devices.

10. Finally, entry into force of the CTBT would greatly reduce the climate of distrust and discontent which has been penetrating the field of disarmament, which distorts all discussions and which makes it even more difficult to address some of today's key challenges posed by the threats of nuclear proliferation.

[2. Weitere Maßnahmen der Advocacy]

Pursuing these good arguments should not be equalized with patronizing of those to be won over. It would rather be a matter of advocacy in the way of clarifying problems, offering additional information, raising consciousness and providing guidance in identifying one's own particular interests. In fact it would be along the traditional pillars of the work of the United Nations, namely advocacy and assistance.

We would also highlight support for other measures, such as the extension of the appointment of the Special Representative, Ambassador Ramaker, who we commend for his work in the past and who we pledge to support as coordinators for the period until the next Conference, another one of the measures.

Support of technical assistance for the ratification process and for implementation measures by the Secretariat, as well as maintaining of a contact point for the exchange and dissemination of relevant information and documentation should be recommended to the PTS. Cooperation with non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians and their international associations, opinion leaders and the media might help

raise awareness for the Treaty and its objectives, including the need for its early entry into force.

A measure of particular importance is to encourage and assist all States Signatories to cooperate fully in the establishment of the verification system in a timely and efficient manner. That will contribute to make the Treaty and its regime even more efficient and to strengthen confidence in the CTBT as an indispensable pillar in the global efforts to control nuclear non-proliferation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Colleagues,

[3. Abschluss: Ermutigende Entwicklungen seit der letzten Artikel XIV Konferenz]

Finally, we would like to address the question of viability of the task of this Conference. Do we see any realistic chance for success of our efforts? Are we not preaching to the converted while those who are relevant for the advancement of the ratification process remain unchanged and unmoved?

First, there has always been some progress, though sometimes the pace might seem slow. Since the last Article XIV Conference, two years ago, 14 additional States have ratified the CTBT, including one Annex 2 State, Vietnam.

Second, none of the remaining ten Annex 2 States has voiced any objection in principle against ratification. Chinese officials have confirmed support for the CTBT while deliberations over its ratification were

ongoing; Colombia, while claiming support for the CTBT, needs to resolve a well-known legal issue before ratification; the ratification by some is linked to regional considerations; India has pledged not to delay entry into force and Pakistan would follow. None of the obstacles that delay ratification in the remaining countries seem unsurmountable. The key to accelerate the process of ratification remains in the leadership role the United States would be ready to assume.

Therefore, and this is our third point, we are carefully watching developments in the United States. The great optimism for early ratification at the end of the nineties has given way to a new assessment of the nuclear posture. We very much hope that this process will lead to a national consensus against future nuclear test explosions. A huge majority of Americans seems to regard the CTBT as a desirable and necessary security step. The world will need the cooperation and leadership of the US to secure success of global efforts against nuclear proliferation and for increased security through efficient and structured disarmament.

The editorial of 4 January 2007 in the Wall Street Journal by Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn augurs well for a new dynamic in strategic thinking. We should not underestimate their assessment of one of the priorities for US security, stating that "Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states."

This kind of renewed support for the goals that we all share would not relieve us of our task as mandated by this Conference. But it would give a new sense and hope to our efforts that we need to redouble in order to succeed facilitating the early entry into force of the CTBT.

We are looking forward to sharing the Presidency of this important Conference and we would wish all of us rewarding discussions. As for the outcome of this Conference, we would want to remind you that its success would prove itself in the result that no further Article XIV Conferences would be required.

Thank you.