

**Statement by H.E Ambassador Soltanieh
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
To the UN and other international organizations in Vienna
To the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of
the CTBT
Vienna, September 17-18, 2007**

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. President,

At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your election to preside over this Conference. We are confident that under your able guidance, positive results could be achieved at this Conference. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Mr Tibor Tóth the Executive Secretary for his efforts in the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

Let me begin my remarks by associating my delegation with the statement made by Malaysia on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement.

Mr. President,

After the catastrophic nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US, elimination of nuclear weapons became an aspiration of the international community. Pursuant to the conclusion of the NPT in 1968 and the commitments made by Nuclear Weapon States to eliminate their nuclear weapons, the international community was very much hopeful to achieve this goal very soon. However the negative developments, namely the defiance of Nuclear Weapon States towards their obligations under the Article VI of the NPT put the future of such a significant goal in jeopardy.

In 1995 NPT review Conference, the Non-Nuclear Weapon States again showed their commitments and optimism toward this very important goal and agreed to the unlimited extension of the NPT, while still waiting for the positive response from the other side. Pursuant to this conference and after the end of cold war, international atmosphere was also conducive to the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty as a significant step toward elimination of nuclear weapons.

Four years of intensive negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament which was resulted to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, however, was not satisfactory to all delegations since the final text only prohibited nuclear test explosion and exempted all other kinds of nuclear tests. Furthermore, the drafters of that final text of the treaty did not take into account the realities of different regions on organizational matters and tried to impose artificial regional groupings.

Despite of these deficiencies, CTBT was adopted by the General Assembly at its 51st resumed session in 1996. If CTBT had a full and comprehensive scope, it could be considered as an important element for the implementation of Article VI of the NPT which requires the total elimination of nuclear weapons. But even with its limited scope, CTBT was measured a major achievement in the field of nuclear disarmament and the 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed this role. In that Conference the Nuclear Weapon States committed themselves to sign and ratify this Treaty without delay as one of the 13 practical steps in implementing the Article VI of the NPT.

Now After 40 years of the NPT and 10 years of the CTBT, it seems we are at the right time to review the past and evaluate our achievements towards this end, namely total elimination of nuclear weapons and the CTBT as an important element in this regard.

Mr. President,

Based on the review of the past 40 years, we should express our regret that the following negative developments not only have jeopardized the prospect of entry into force of the Treaty, but also our final goal which is the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

1- Lack of progress and goodwill toward elimination of nuclear weapons by the NWSs, and the continued existences of thousands of nuclear warheads in the nuclear-weapon States' stockpiles,

2- upgrading and modernizing the nuclear weapons by some of the NWSs in violation of the spirit and letter of the CTBT.

In this regard it is worth-mentioning that Further to the US decision to develop new types of nuclear weapons, its recent statement in July 2007 in which it has tried to justify on the need to invest in the Reliable Replacement

Warhead (RRW) and thus modernizing its nuclear infrastructure as part of its nuclear deterrent force is another setback in the field of nuclear disarmament. They have even argued that delays on RRW would raise the prospect of having to return to underground nuclear testing, which is a clear violation of the spirit and letter of the CTBT. The decision of the UK Government to upgrade its nuclear weapons submarine (Trident) under the artificial and unrealistic pretext of the nuclear threat and deterrent is also another clear violation of article VI of the NPT as well as the CTBT.

3- Instrumental and political use of international nuclear disarmament Treaties by some nuclear weapon States,

4- Firmly and officially rejection of the CTBT by a major Nuclear Weapon States,

In this context, the rejection of the CTBT by the United States has damaged the prospect of the entry into force of the Treaty. Furthermore, its selective and political approach towards the Treaty in the Preparatory Commission, namely rejection of the On-Site Inspection (OSI) and at the same time using the advantages of receiving data from the International monitoring system (IMS) before entry of into force of the CTBT which are not consistent with the provisions of the Treaty, mandate of the Preparatory Commission, and international law, has raised some grave concerns as well. Insistence on this approach will put the future of the CTBT in jeopardy.

5- Acknowledgment of the possession of nuclear weapons by Israeli regime as a clear violation of the spirit and letter of the CTBT, which faced with the condemnation by a majority of the countries which are Non-Aligned Movement, and regrettably, the silence of the western countries. This is again a clear example of the double standard policy by the West towards nuclear disarmament and non proliferation regime,

Mr. President,

The above mentioned realities and developments which are examples of unilateral, discriminatory and non-balanced approach of few NWSs towards the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have increased the current gap and lack of confidence by the NNWSs which, in turn, has jeopardized the entry into force of the CTBT. Such a confidence, if restored, would facilitate the early into force of the Treaty.

In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the following key factors could pave the way for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in general, and early entry into force of the CTBT in particular:

- The NWSs bear the main responsibility in entry into force of the CTBT and they should take the lead in this regard. Ratification of the CTBT by Nuclear Weapon States could be considered as a positive step towards restoration of the confidence of NNWSs and international community.
- Some of the Annex II States are not even a party to the NPT and have un-safeguarded nuclear material and facilities. Their promptly acceding to the NPT would be another significant element in facilitating early entry into force of the CTBT.

Thank you Mr. President.