

Please check against delivery

**Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force
of CTBT, Vienna, 17-18 September 2007**

**Statement
by
Ambassador Shahbaz
Permanent Representative of PAKISTAN
to the International Organizations in Vienna**

President,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all I would like to congratulate you, President, on your election to co-preside over the Conference. I would also like to express our appreciation to the Secretariat for the preparations made for this Conference.

Pakistan had participated actively in the negotiations that led to the finalization of the CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament. We not only endorsed the Treaty in the CD but also voted in favour of the General Assembly Resolution in 1996 which called for its adoption. Pakistan is an accredited observer state of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and we have taken note of the positive developments and progress achieved so far.

Despite being a non-signatory state, we are not opposed to the objectives and purposes of the treaty. Pakistan had resolved to abide by the main provisions of the Treaty by declaring and maintaining a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing in 1998.

Pakistan firmly believes in the universally agreed principle of equal security for all states at the minimum level of armaments. We were not the first to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia and our nuclear tests in 1998 were meant to restore the strategic balance in the region. Pakistan has acquired nuclear deterrence in the interest of its security and for peace and stability in the region. After the May 1998 nuclear explosions, as a responsible nuclear weapon state, Pakistan has maintained its policy of restraint and responsibility. We have stated that we will not be the first to resume nuclear testing. Pakistan stands by this commitment.

The security environment in South Asia has visibly improved with the initiation of a composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. However, durable peace and security in the region will require earnest efforts. In this

regard, Pakistan had proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime comprising three inter-locking elements, which included; (i) resolution of all outstanding disputes; (ii) promotion of nuclear and missile restraint; and (iii) maintenance of conventional forces balance. We also believe that the objective of maintaining strategic stability in South Asia needs to be facilitated by ending discriminatory practices like giving or denying access to civilian nuclear technology selectively in order to gain national strategic objectives.

President,

Keeping in view the theme of the Conference, I would like to enumerate some steps which, in our view, would facilitate the achievement of the objectives of this Conference. These include:-

- i) Restoration of support for the CTBT by its major erstwhile proponents.
- ii) Addressing the motives and compulsions which prompt states to acquire nuclear weapons. These include; (i) threats from non-conventional or superior conventional forces; (ii) the existence of disputes and conflicts with more powerful states, and (iii) discrimination in the application of international laws.
- iii) Renewed commitment and tangible progress by all Nuclear Weapon States for complete nuclear disarmament. Regrettably, the current trend is the exact opposite, where certain states are modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Discrimination and asymmetric possession of WMDs undermine the objectives of non-proliferation and regional or global security.
- iv) Creation of a stable and balanced security environment in sensitive regions like South Asia and the Middle East by; (i) establishing nuclear restraint and non-proliferation measures; (ii) balance in conventional forces; and (iii) resolving underlying security problems and outstanding disputes.
- v) Ending discriminatory practices like giving or denying access to civilian nuclear technology selectively in order to gain national strategic aims in disregard of any generally applicable criteria. This approach detracts from the credibility and legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime.

I thank you President.
