
**Statement by
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization**

**Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the
2010 NPT Review Conference
New York, 4 to 15 May 2009**

Mr. Chairman,

1. Allow me to express my appreciation for the opportunity to address this Third Preparatory Committee session. The last time that the Commission addressed an NPT review forum in a sustained way was back in the 2000 cycle. Because of that I will provide a more comprehensive overview of the progress achieved by the Organization.
2. Firstly, however, I would like to thank all delegations that have expressed their support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Commission in their statements during the past few days. This is an overwhelming verdict on the part of the international community, including all five NPT nuclear weapon States, in favour of putting an end to the era of nuclear testing.
3. The Treaty has endured politically stormy times since it first opened for signature in 1996. Yet, despite the challenges, and probably because of them, support for it has grown continuously. At the time of the 2000 review conference 56 States had ratified it. As of today, 180 countries have signed the CTBT, and 148 States have also ratified it. Since 2000 nearly 100 States by the virtue of their ratification voted with their feet. It is the most genuine demonstration that the international community is not just a fair-weather companion of this Treaty. Nine Annex II countries still need to ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force. There is further and renewed hope. An important manifestation of such a hope is the goal stated by President Obama and his administration, reiterated at this Preparatory Committee session by the U.S. delegation.
4. In this context, I would like to draw your attention to the upcoming Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT (also known as the Article XIV conference). It will take place in New York from 24 to 25 September 2009. Previous Article XIV conferences have been attended by Foreign Ministers and other senior representatives of CTBT Signatories. They have thus become the largest high-level gathering in the non-proliferation and disarmament arena during the past decade. Moreover, Article XIV conferences have traditionally adopted a consensus declaration

with a programme of action – another scarce commodity in this field. This year's conference will be of particular importance. It will offer a unique opportunity to capitalize on the fresh political momentum and to send a high level signal of unity of purpose for the entry into force of the Treaty. I sincerely hope that all State Signatories will seize this exceptional opportunity and attend this conference at the highest possible level.

Mr. Chairman,

5. Back in the spring of 2000 the build-up the Treaty's verification regime was still at an early stage. The International Monitoring System (IMS) was more a concept than reality. We reported then that none of the stations in the four verification technologies had been officially certified. A first generation Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI) had been in place to transmit data from our stations to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna. Data distribution to State Signatories was still in a testing phase. And we reported that some experiments and training activities to establish the Treaty's on-site inspection (OSI) were being undertaken. Much progress has been achieved since.
6. Today the CTBT verification regime is nearing completion. From the 2000 level we have moved to 236 certified stations. Thus 75 percent of the system's 321 global monitoring stations already send data to headquarters in Vienna. Ten radionuclide laboratories have been certified. Several more IMS stations have been built and are in the process of being certified and many more are under construction.
7. A new Global Communication Infrastructure "GCI II" is now up and running and relaying data back and forth across the globe. The volume of data being transmitted from monitoring facilities to the international data centre has tripled just in the last five years. The daily content of data analysis, so-called data products, provided to States Signatories has doubled in the same period. Software improvements have led to the delivery of more detailed and significantly higher quality data products. 110 countries and 1100 institutions are beneficiaries of the data and the data products generated by this unprecedented joint venture.
8. Great strides have been made towards achieving on-site inspection readiness. The first integrated on-site inspection field exercise took place in September 2009 in the former Soviet Union nuclear test site of Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. The parameters of the exercise speak for themselves: 1000 square kilometres of inspection area, a team of 40 inspectors, overall logistical support for nearly 200 participants, four weeks of activities, 50 tonnes of equipment, comprising a dozen different verification technologies. Many valuable lessons were learned. They will be fed into our OSI preparations as we move forward towards operational readiness.
9. We are coming within sight of the fulfilment of our mandate as a Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. Our main task it is to establish the global verification regime so that it is fully operational once the Treaty enters into force. Theory is moving in to the realm of established fact.

10. The CTBT verification regime was validated two and a half years ago when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted its nuclear test. Only half of the CTBT's International Monitoring System had been installed at the time. But the verification system exceeded the expectations of the Treaty negotiators in 1996 in terms of sensitivity, reliability, precision and characterization. The technical capability – the quality of the information and data generated by the system – was proven. The low yield explosion was detected by over 20 of the IMS seismic stations worldwide, which registered the shock waves in the ground. Traces of radioactive noble gas were picked up and could be attributed to the DPRK test. This is a technology which was at an early experimental stage at the time of the conception of the CTBT verification regime. It has significantly increased the ability to detect and identify nuclear explosions. And when combined with the final arm of the verification regime – on-site inspections – which can only be invoked after entry into force, no country today can be confident of being able to evade detection.
11. The recent threat by the DPRK to conduct another nuclear test underscores the urgent need for establishing a legally binding universal ban on nuclear testing through the early entry into force of the CTBT. All States should refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.
12. But you need not take our word for it that the CTBT is verifiable. The constant close interaction with the scientific community is one of the key challenges for the Preparatory Commission, given the highly specialized technological focus of our verification mandate. We have initiated the “International Scientific Studies” (ISS) project. It aims to assess and evaluate the readiness and capability of the CTBT verification regime in a coordinated international effort. Scientific institutions worldwide have conducted independent scientific work for more than a year, and will present their results at the International Scientific Studies Conference, to be held in Vienna from 10 to 12 June 2009. The build up of the CTBT verification regime has reached such an advanced stage. Thus the ISS project is of particular relevance for our ability to stay abreast with the latest scientific developments in our field.

Mr. Chairman,

13. The CTBT will only enter into force if States, in particular the remaining Annex II States, see it as being fundamental to their national interest. Essentially, they must ask themselves: is it better to keep the door open for testing in the future and thereby also keep it open for others? Or should a cap be placed on the development of nuclear weapons by possessors and non-possessors alike in the implementation of a universal barrier? Compared to 2000 they have to make this judgement in a strategically different environment: one in which there is greatly heightened attention to non-state actors, their potential access to nuclear weapons, devices, fissile material, technology and expertise. I am convinced that the Treaty has a key role to play in today's security environment. A strong and verifiable final barrier on the road to a nuclear weapons capability is of vital importance for a comprehensive approach to address our common security challenges. This contribution goes beyond establishing the norm against nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.

14. The CTBT is a strong instrument for non-proliferation; its credentials in this regard are clear. Testing is necessary for the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons by established nuclear weapon possessors. It is also essential for establishing technical and scientific confidence in any developing programme on the part of would-be possessors. Making the *de-facto* international norm against nuclear testing legally binding through the entry into force of the Treaty will close this door once and for all.
15. Once the CTBT's unprecedented verification regime is fully operationalized, issues of non-compliance can then be addressed properly, in a pre-determined and pre-agreed manner, as foreseen in the Treaty. There are increased concerns over non-compliance in other quarters of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including with the NPT. Against this background the compliance mechanisms built into the Treaty are of extreme importance in strengthening the overall objectives of the NPT.
16. The CTBT is also a catalyst for nuclear disarmament. It provides a firm legal barrier against nuclear testing, thereby curbing the development of new types and new designs of nuclear weapons by possessors.
17. Moreover, the CTBT is a strong confidence and security building measure. A CTBT in place will be an essential element for a process in which deeper arms reductions are being discussed and pursued by nuclear weapons States. A CTBT in force will be equally essential when moving towards multilateral disarmament in a process involving all the nuclear armed States. Also, the CTBT could serve as a regional confidence and security building measure, for example in the Middle East and in Asia.
18. As we have all witnessed in the past years, the NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is challenged on many fronts. There is a common enemy in the very real prospect of some form of nuclear terrorism. We stand united against this common enemy – States and international organizations alike. Moreover, the challenges are taking place in the face of a global nuclear energy renaissance. With much more fissile material in circulation, and more actors handling that material, as predicted, we urgently need a strengthened comprehensive system of barriers against misuse. Such a systemic approach to address the challenges of the nuclear regime requires - as the last barrier against nuclear weapons – would be the CTBT in force.
19. I am convinced that the Treaty represents one of the key elements on which effective international consensus can be built in advance of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Its entry into force and full implementation are achievable and doable. It means progress on each of the three main pillars. It bridges the divide between the different emphases placed on each of these pillars by the NPT's different parties. It signals commitment to disarmament. It strengthens non-proliferation. It facilitates peaceful uses. Of course, it is not sufficient. But it is necessary for success.
20. Progress on the CTBT's entry into force is one of the most important catalysts. It could drive the international community's resolve to address the multitude of challenges facing the non-proliferation regime. As such it is a measure where progress can be achieved in a relatively short time. The Treaty already exists. It has been signed by 180

and ratified by almost 150 States. Its verification regime is close to completion. And it has been tried and tested.

21. The CTBT is, of course, not the only answer to concerns generated by nuclear weapons. It is to be an integral part of a strengthened comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The Treaty's entry into force will pave the way to solving many of the current and future challenges facing the regime.